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1 Introduction 
 
The use of performance-related pay among executives has increased considerably over the past twenty 
years (Murphy 1999, Hall and Liebman 1998). However, it is still not clear what the causes of this 
phenomenon are or whether this trend also extends to lower layers of a firm’s labor force. At the same 
time, there has been a trend towards increasing product market competition associated with the spread of 
information technologies, decreasing transport costs, numerous deregulation waves and reductions in 
trade barriers. There is empirical evidence that increased competition makes firms become more 
productive and aggressive when exposed to higher competition levels. These papers show that more 
competition leads to higher effort provision (Nickell, 1996; Griffith, 2000), productivity (Galdon-
Sanchez and Schmitz, 2002) and innovation (Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen, 1999). However, there 
is little work surrounding whether firms use other instruments, such as performance related pay, to 
increase the productivity of their workers following an increase in competition1. A number of theoretical 
papers (Schmidt, 1997; Raith, 2003; Vives, 2004) illustrate the relationship between these two elements. 
Two counteracting effects are at work. On the one hand, more competition raises the reward for market 
stealing activities, increasing the marginal return to managerial and workers’ effort. For this reason firms 
may introduce steeper incentive packages to induce their workers to work harder. On the other hand, the 
residual demand that a firm faces may shrink, making market stealing less attractive. On top of these two 
effects an implicit discipline effect may also be at work. If a higher competition level increases the threat 
of going bankrupt when the firm underperforms, this may provide an implicit incentive to exert effort, 
thus reducing the need for additional incentive schemes. Overall, the total effect of competition on the 
performance pay sensitivity is to a large extent ambiguous. In spite of the interest of the question and the 
ambiguity of the theoretical results, the number of articles exploring this matter at an empirical level is 
very limited and generally restricted to top executives. The aim of this paper is to evaluate how the slope 
of performance-related-pay changes for the highest paid director, other directors and workers, following 
changes in product market competition. We estimate the slope of performance-related pay directly from 
the data using a panel of UK firms that contains information about highest paid director’s pay, average 
directors’ pay and average salaries of 22,183 firms in the manufacturing sector. These firms range from 
the biggest firms in the UK economy to small ones of only five employees. This is an important 
advantage of our sample, as previous studies have concentrated mainly on top executive compensation in 
large firms. The UK perspective is also interesting, since it has been reported that the pay-performance 
sensitivity of top executives in the UK dropped significantly in the late 80s (Gregg, Machin and 
Szymanski, 1992). However, there is evidence showing that this trend might have been reversed in the 
90’s (Conyon and Murphy, 2000). It is unclear whether the evolution of the competitive environment had 
any influence on this change. The measure of competition used in the analysis is an important issue. 
While most economists would agree on the definition of a monopoly or perfect competition, agreeing 
                                                 1 See Lazear (2000) and Booth and Frank (1999) for empirical evidence on the increases in productivity associated 
with steeper performance-related-pay contracts. 
on an empirical measure of the degree of competition is more controversial. At the same
time, many of the most commonly used measures, such as concentration ratios, are subject
to numerous caveats because it is often unclear what they are actually measuring and
because of the endogeneity of market structure (Schmalensee, 1989). Similarly, if diﬀerent
compensation packages may induce the firms to act more or less aggressively, the degree of
competition in the industry may be endogenous to the compensation package.2
To identify the causal eﬀect of competition on performance-related pay and avoid pos-
sible endogeneity problems, we exploit a quasi-natural experiment. This is the sharp appre-
ciation of the Pound Sterling in 1996 that implied a sudden change in the relative costs and
prices between UK manufactures and foreign products. It primarily had a negative eﬀect
on producers in sectors that exported a significant share of their output, or that faced a
significant level of imports in the local market. The appreciation can therefore be seen as an
exogenous change in competition such that the increase in competitive pressure was higher
for firms in more open sectors. We therefore use it to identify the causal eﬀect of compet-
ition on performance related pay through a diﬀerence in diﬀerences approach. This allows
us to distinguish it from a general time trend in performance-related pay, or cross-sectional
diﬀerences in contracts.
The results show that competition increased the steepness of performance-related-pay.
This eﬀect holds, with diﬀerent intensities, for the highest paid director, and other direct-
ors, and it is robust to using diﬀerent openness measures as an index of exposure to the
appreciation. At the same time firms increased the slope of performance contracts, they
reduced the fixed component of pay. For workers, the eﬀect of competition is weaker, mostly
not significant, and the estimated baseline sensitivities are small.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the exist-
ing theoretical and empirical literature on the topic. Section 3 presents the identification
strategy used. Section 4 contains a description of the data. Section 5 shows the results of
the estimation and Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our aim in this article is to measure how the implicit incentives provided by product
market competition interact with the explicit and implicit contracts that firms have with
2See among others Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987) and Salas Fumas (1992) for theoretical
contributions to this topic.
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their managers and workers. The theoretical literature that underlies the empirical analysis
is based on principal agent theory, where in the presence of asymmetric information on the
agent’s eﬀort, it is optimal for principals to oﬀer performance-related-pay.
In the spirit of this literature, the theoretical papers by Schmidt (1997) and Raith (2003)
investigate how the change in the distribution of profits induced by changes in product
market competition aﬀects the optimal incentive scheme that principals provide. Vives
(2004) generalizes the analysis to any fixed expense that reduces future marginal costs and
to diﬀerent competitive regimes. In all these papers, compensation agreements are the result
of a two-stage game with multiple players (firms) where, in the first stage the structure
of compensation is specified (the investment decision made in Vives, 2004), and in the
second stage production occurs and firms sell their product in the imperfectly competitive
product market. In Schmidt’s paper, the explicit contracting between the shareholders of
a firm (principal) and an employee (agent) is aﬀected by the implicit conditions that the
competitive environment imposes on the worker. The employee is explicitly modeled as a
manager, but the implications of the model could also apply to any other worker.
Competition has two diﬀerent types of eﬀects on the incentives to exert eﬀort or behave
in the interest of the shareholders. On the one hand, a higher level of competition means
that the elasticity of the firm’s market share to an increase in productivity (cost reduction,
increase in quality, etc.) increases. Therefore the returns to the eﬀort of the employee
grow, which implies that in the face of an increase in competition, shareholders will provide
more high-powered incentives in order to adjust to this new sensitivity. On the other hand,
a higher level of competition means lower prices for the firm “caeteris paribus”, so that a
given share of the market becomes less valuable. Furthermore, more competition may imply
a higher risk of bankruptcy. As long as the employee of the firm wants to keep her job,
the threat of bankruptcy implicitly disciplines her. This allows shareholders to reduce the
steepness of the incentives provided. Overall, these mechanisms partially counteract each
other, and the net eﬀect of competition is ambiguous: it can generate steeper or flatter
explicit incentives.
In Raith (2003), higher product market competition is modelled as an increase in the
elasticity of substitution between goods in a Salop model with endogenous entry and exit
of competitors. After an increase in competition, prices and profits fall, leading to the exit
of some unprofitable firms. The endogenous exit of these firms is what restores the original
profit level, eliminating the counteracting eﬀects of the fall in profits present in Schmidt’s
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paper. Therefore, the prediction is that more competition should unambiguously lead to
steeper explicit incentives.
Vives (2004), in a more general model, shows that the net eﬀect of an increase in
competition on cost reduction eﬀort will still depend on the relative size of the same two
types of eﬀects. A higher elasticity of the residual demand that firms face and a lower size
of this residual demand. The net eﬀect of these two forces is still ambiguous, although the
elasticity eﬀect tends to dominate for most of the diﬀerent competitive specifications.
A related strand of literature considers how the optimal incentive package may change
according to whether competition among firms is in strategic complements or substitutes.
Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), Salas Fumas (1992) and Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999) show that principals can commit to compete more or less aggressively in the product
market through the compensation packages they provide. They will vary the degree of rel-
ative performance evaluation to motivate workers to behave in a particular way. Note that,
in this setting, the degree of competition is in some sense endogenous to the compensation
package. In our empirical analysis, we address this issue. By using an exogenous shock in
competition we ensure the causality is going only in one direction -from product market
structure to performance-related-pay. In addition, we will also assess the extent of relative
performance evaluation as a robustness check.
Firms can relate pay to performance either through explicit written contracts or through
implicit contracts(agreements which are not written but sustained on the basis of repeated
interaction). Theoretical results show that in fact it is probably optimal to use a combin-
ation of both types of performance-related-pay (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy ;1994). Our
empirical approach does not allow us to distinguish between these two alternative types of
deal.3 This is an empirical limitation of our data, but the contribution of the paper to the
literature is still relevant as the theoretical arguments behind our approach do not rely on
incentive-pay being provided necessarily through an explicit contract. Throughout the rest
of the paper we use the term "contract" referring to both implicit and explicit contracts.
Finally, it must be noted that incentive contracts are not the only way that firms may
use to motivate their workers or ensure eﬀort exertion. This is particularly true for workers
low in the firm hierarchy. Other types of mechanisms such as direct monitoring or eﬃciency
wages are possible. Most of these operate through fixed wages and are not performance-
3We are also not able to distinguish whether firms change their compensation agreements as
competition changes or whether these compensation agreements are flexible enough to adapt
to new competitive environments.
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related. Our empirical approach does not allow us to distinguish between a higher propensity
to use incentive pay versus the use of steeper contracts on the same set of workers. From
the point of view of principal agent theory this should not pose a problem. A worker that
receives zero performance-related-pay can be seen as a particular case of performance related
pay with no slope. However, there may be other factors that aﬀect the use of performance-
related-pay. For example MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) show that the likelihood of
using incentive pay versus eﬃciency wages should be higher when skilled workers are in
short supply and the threat of firing is therefore less harmful for these workers. While
these considerations are important in determining the use of performance-related-pay, they
are likely to be uncorrelated with our quasi-natural experiment, and should not aﬀect our
identification strategy.
Similarly, it is likely that in cases where team-work is important, firms may decide not
to give incentive pay because workers will have an incentive to free ride. However, firms
may overcome this problem by providing group incentives (Holmstrom, 1982) that would
still be captured in our regressions. In any case, it is likely that some firms decide not to
provide performance related pay, and therefore what we estimate is the average propensity
to increase sensitivities without being able to disentangle whether it is because firms decide
to start providing incentive contracts, or because they increase the sensitivity of the existing
ones.
The evidence regarding the relationship between competition and incentive pay is still
very limited. Hubbard and Palia (1995) use the deregulation of the commercial banking
industry in the 80s to explain the increase in performance-related pay among CEOs in
commercial banking. Even though it seems that deregulation increased the fixed part of
CEO pay, they find no significant eﬀect on the slope of the contracts. Burgess and Metcalfe
(2000) use cross-sectional questionnaire data in which managers are asked to declare whether
they use some kind of performance-related pay, and a self-reported measure of competition.
Their results show that the likelihood of having performance-related pay among UK workers
increases with competition.4 However, given the cross sectional nature of their dataset, they
are not able to control for unobserved heterogeneity, or calculate the actual sensitivities of
performance-related pay contracts5.
4Their definition of performance-related pay includes pay associated to observable variables such as sales
(individual or group ones) but explicitly excludes profit related pay.
5Santalo (2001) uses a similar cross section of Canadian retail stores and finds a non-monotonic, U-shaped
relationship between the use of performance-related pay among middle managers and competition. Both
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Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) explore the eﬀect of the strategic interaction between
firms on executive compensation. Their identification strategy involves the use of Herfindahl
indices to disentangle whether firms use their compensation packages as a way to encourage
either aggressive competitive strategies or tacit collusion between firms.6 Even though they
do not directly address the issue of how the sensitivity of their own performance measure
should be aﬀected, some of their results can be interpreted along this line. In general, their
results remain ambiguous with respect to own performance. If anything, the paper tends to
find that sectors with lower Herfindahl indices are associated with flatter incentive schemes.
A related stream of literature investigates the eﬀects of product market competition on
CEO turnover. DeFond and Park (1999) find that higher levels of product market com-
petition lead to higher CEO turnover, and that the use of relative performance evaluation
to dismiss a CEO is more intense in highly competitive sectors, while low competition sec-
tors rely more on absolute performance measures.7 These results seem to indicate that the
implicit incentives provided by the threat of dismissal are intensified in more competitive
sectors.
This article extends the existing literature in several dimensions. To begin, we use a
quasi-natural experiment as a measure of an exogenous change in product market com-
petition. This change aﬀects diﬀerent sectors with varying intensity. This allows us to use
a diﬀerence in diﬀerences methodology to disentangle the causal eﬀect of interest from a
time trend or from cross-sectional diﬀerences that could endogenously arise across sectors.
Secondly, we can estimate actual performance-pay sensitivities for the highest paid director,
other directors and workers. Most of the existing literature concentrates on CEOs or con-
tains only qualitative measures of the use of performance-related pay schemes within firms.
Finally, we use a broad sample of UK firms. This allows us to estimate sensitivities that
are hard to capture in small samples, as well as to reveal new results in a literature that
has typically used much smaller samples of large firms.
articles have the natural limitations of survey data.
6See also Kedia (2003) and Joh (1999) for evidence on the eﬀect of strategic interaction on performance
pay.
7See also Oxelheim and Randoy (2002) who find lower CEO average tenure in more competitive sectors.
Hubbard and Palia (1995) also find a higher CEO turnover rate among derregulated banks.
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3 Estimation Procedure and Identification Strategy
To estimate the influence of product market competition on the sensitivity of performance-
related pay we use a sample of UK firms for which we have data on total compensation of the
highest paid director, average executive compensation and average worker compensation.
Total compensation for each group of workers in firm f , in sector j, in year t, can be
written as Wfjt = Afjt+Bfjt(Perffjt)+ufjt which contains a fixed component Afjt and a
variable component Bfjt(Perffjt), that is a function of performance. Both the level of pay
and its sensitivity to performance will vary across firms and sectors with diﬀerent features.
We explicitly model the major determinants of these coeﬃcients in our empirical analysis
assuming linear relationships as:
Wfjt = Afjt +BfjtPerffjt + ufjt
Afjt = a0 + a1Cjt +
X
azXfjt ; Bfjt = b0 + b1Cjt +
X
bzZfjt
Where Perffjt is the performance measure, Cjt is the competition measure that has
an eﬀect both on the levels and on the slope of compensation. The variables Xfjt and
Zfjt are control variables, such as firm size, which influence either the fixed or the variable
component of pay. It is important to realize that the sensitivity changes according to sector
and firm characteristics. Given the assumed compensation structure, the estimation of the
compensation equation should include terms where the performance measures interact with
competition and other variables. The specification we obtain is the following reduced form:
Wifjt = a0 + a1Cjt + b0Perffjt + b1CjtPerffjt (1)
+
X
azXifjt +
X
bkZfjtPerffjt + dt + ηf + fjt
Where dt are time dummies, ηf are firm permanent unobserved components (that also
capture sector eﬀects because firms do not change sectors) and fjt is a white noise. Our
main interest is in the sign and magnitude of the coeﬃcient b1, which measures the change
in the performance sensitivity of compensation (the change in B) as competition changes.
Next, it is important to discuss the actual competition measure used, Cjt, as this will
have a bearing on how the equation must be specified. Our competition measure exploits
as a quasi-natural experiment a change in the competitive environment that aﬀected firms
with diﬀerent intensities.
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The quasi-natural experiment is the sudden appreciation of the British Pound in 19968.
Figure 1 shows the eﬀective exchange rate of the British Pound against all currencies
weighted by their relative importance in British imports and exports. There are clearly
two diﬀerent regimes of low and high eﬀective exchange rate before and after 1996. These
will be the two periods exploited. What follows is a discussion on why it can be used as an
experiment for an increase in product market competition.
The appreciation was hardly predictable by the firms in our sample. Its direct eﬀect was
to reduce the prices that foreign competitors could oﬀer in the UK market, as well as the
relative price of UK exports. Another way of seeing this is that the appreciation actually
reduces the costs of foreign firms relative to UK costs so that some foreign firms that were not
competitive enough at the old relative costs can now start selling in the UK. Furthermore,
this reduction in costs has an eﬀect on equilibrium prices, which reflects the extent of the
increase in competition. Dornbusch (1987) develops this argument. Under the Cournot,
Dixit-Stiglitz and Salop models of competition, he shows that as the domestic currency
appreciates, the relative costs of domestic firms increase, domestic prices fall, and they do
more so in sectors with high import penetration9. Thus, in the short-run an appreciation
will have a larger impact on prices in sectors with high levels of import penetration. In
this situation, high cost domestic firms are more likely to go bankrupt. This increases the
pressure on domestic sectors where import penetration is important. The appreciation can
therefore be used as a measure of an exogenous change in competitive pressure.
Beyond these immediate eﬀects on competition via relative costs and prices, several
papers examine the theoretical relationship between structural changes in competition and
exchange rates. In particular Baldwin (1988), Dixit (1989) and Baldwin and Krugman
(1989), show that a large appreciation may permanently reshape the competitive structure
of the local market. These papers have as their starting point a situation in which foreign
firms that would want to sell in the local market, do not do so because they would have
to spend entry costs in the form of R&D, creating distribution channels, or building up a
reputation. These sunk costs have to be paid in order to sell in the local market for the
first time. The appreciation of the local currency gives foreign firms a window of years
in which they are relatively more competitive than local firms. This advantage will make
8Empirically, Bertrand (1999) and Revenga (1992) also use an identification for changes in competition
based on international trade variables. They both use import penetration at industry level as a measure of
competition and instrument it using exchange rate fluctuations.
9A symmetric argument can be done on exports and the importance of domestic firms in foreign markets.
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them enter and incur the entry cost. After the eﬀects of the appreciation disappear, either
because there is a subsequent depreciation, or because the local prices of factors adjust to
reestablish the competitiveness of local firms, the original competitive configuration is not
restored. This is because foreign firms that have already entered do not leave and possibly
because some local firms that closed do not reopen. A symmetric argument may be made
for exporting firms that decide to stop exporting (or simply close) during the appreciation
and do not resume operations later on. Under this perspective, the appreciation is like a
temporary fall in entry barriers that has permanent eﬀects on the competitive configuration
of the industry.
Depending on the period chosen, the magnitude of the appreciation ranges between 21%
to 25% -already indicating that it may have had an important impact on UK firms that
were exposed to foreign competition. Although we cannot provide a direct test of its eﬀect
on competition, results like the impact on quantities, prices and profits, can be used as
suggestive evidence to assess the validity of the appreciation to measure competition.
First, the appreciation generated a significant shock on UK exports and imports. Table
2 shows the aggregate eﬀect on the balance of trade in goods. Notice first that, overall, the
value of imports increases and the value of exports falls, but these magnitudes do not take
into account the fact that prices of foreign goods are falling. Accounting for this (since the
pound appreciation was above 20%), the actual increase in the volume of imports is much
higher: the market share and the number of foreign competitors in the UK increases. In
1997 there is a small positive eﬀect on the balance of trade. This is a natural eﬀect if there
is some inertia on the quantities exported and imported; the appreciation meant higher
export prices and lower import prices, so the balance of payments can initially improve.
However, from 1998 onwards the quantity eﬀect dominates and the balance of trade nearly
doubled its previous deficit.
Second, there is evidence of the eﬀect of the appreciation on prices. Gagnon (2003)
estimates that UK firms absorbed about 40% of the impact by reducing their prices.10 The
rest of the impact was absorbed by quantities. Both the reduction in markups and the fall
in sales had a strong impact on their profits. Coutts and Norman (2002) perform a detailed
sector by sector analysis of the long run impact of foreign prices on UKmanufacturing prices.
The first interesting result demonstrates that after 1996, the prices at which foreign firms
10Martin (1997) estimates that over the 1951-91 period, the average impact on UK prices of a change in
foreign prices was about 25%.
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sold their products fell between 8% and roughly the full size of the appreciation, depending
on sectors. This means that foreign firms kept their markups constant or increased them
by up to 13%. On the other hand, UK firms reduced their markups or kept them constant.
This meant a sharp break in the trend of markups, which had been steadily growing in the
UK during the 80s and early 90s. Coutts and Norman (2002) also indicate that following
the 1996 appreciation, firms absorbed a large amount of the impact through non-price
initiatives. While downsizing was the most likely option for multinationals that could
produce elsewhere, UK firms relied on reorganizations and a redefinition of products.
Third, we can assess the eﬀect the appreciation had on profits. Within our sample the
eﬀect can be seen in Figure 2, which shows the evolution of median profits for a subsample
that contains the balanced panel of our dataset.11 We evaluate the diﬀerential eﬀect of the
appreciation for firms with openness (import penetration + export share) above or below
the sample median. The eﬀect is quite strong for both subsamples. There is a general
slowdown in profit growth after the depreciation. For the very open firms the eﬀect is much
more severe, even though in 1997 they do slightly better (an example is the improvement in
the aggregate case where, if export firms had signed contracts prior to 1997 for goods that
were delivered afterwards, the appreciation was to their benefit). After 1997 the reaction in
quantities has a strong impact on open firms. The eﬀect is much less important for firms
that belong to relatively closed sectors. In fact, after the initial shock, they are able to
partially return to their old profit growth rates.
To distinguish between sectors that were highly exposed to this appreciation from sectors
that were relatively shielded from it we interact the experiment (the dummy Post97t takes
value one from 1997 onwards) with a “treatment” variable that is a measure of the openness
of the sector (Openj). The competition variable, which we called Cjt in the previous
equation, is now constructed by interacting the two variables and becomes Openj Post97t.
In the empirical analysis we use two diﬀerent measures of openness for Openj , namely
import penetration (import at a sector level as a proportion of total output plus net imports)
and the share of exports in total output (sector exports divided by sector output). Since
import penetration and export openness may be changing endogenously with exchange rate
fluctuations, we take the mean of the relevant openness measure in the period prior to 1996
to avoid this endogeneity. Because most of our firms are not publicly traded and no stock
11This balanced subsample contains 58,300 observations. We do not include 1992 in the balanced sample as
there are only 2,071 observations on that particular year, and because it would greatly reduce the subsample.
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market information exists for them, the measure of performance used is accounting profits
Profitfjt . The first specification we present is:
Wifjt = a0 + a1Openj Post97t + b0 Profitfjt + b1Openj Post97t Profitfjt (2)
+
X
azXifjt +
X
bzZfjt Profitfjt + dt + ηf + dj t+ fjt
b1 captures the diﬀerential eﬀect of the appreciation of the pound between sectors that
were highly exposed to this appreciation, and sectors that were relatively shielded from it.
A positive b1 would mean that sectors suﬀering a higher increase in competition increased
more (or decreased less) the steepness of their performance-related-pay after the appreci-
ation of the pound. Note however, that this specification, even though it provides a full
“diﬀerence in diﬀerences” estimator for the eﬀect of competition on the level of pay a1, only
yields a standard “diﬀerence” estimator for the eﬀect of competition on the slope of pay to
performance b1.
For a diﬀerence in diﬀerences specification on the slope of incentive pay, two additional
variables are necessary. The first is an interaction between Post97t and profit. This accounts
for the fact that firms in all sectors may have increased their slope after the appreciation.
The second variable is the interaction between exposure (Openj) and profits, which accounts
for the fact that diﬀerent sectors may have had diﬀerent slopes throughout the analysis.
This is the standard specification needed to obtain a diﬀerence in diﬀerences estimator
for the slope. This identification allows us to disentangle the eﬀect of competition from a
general change over time in performance-related pay, or persistent cross-sectional diﬀerences
between sectors.
Wifjt = a0 + a1Openj Post97t + b0Profitfjt + b1Openj Post97t Profitfjt + b2Openj Profitfjt
+b3Post97t Profitfjt +
X
azXifjt +
X
bzZfjt Profitfjt + dt + ηf + dj t+ fjt (3)
The specification also accounts for biases arising from the correlation between any per-
manent unobserved component of the wage equation and the included regressors by intro-
ducing firm fixed eﬀects in all specifications. Given that firms do not change sector, these
fixed eﬀects should also capture the existence of any sector fixed eﬀects.12 We also introduce
year dummies (dj) and sector specific time trends (dj t) in all the regressions. The year
12We cannot identify the identity of the individual in the CEO data. The average director compensation
and the average firm wage by definition are not individual magnitudes, so individual fixed eﬀects are not
feasible.
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dummies control for any general evolution of salaries in the economy and the sector specific
trends for deviations at a sector level from this evolution.
One potential caveat to the interpretation of b1 as the diﬀerential eﬀect of competition
on performance pay sensitivities would be the presence of another mechanism that is af-
fected after the appreciation. For instance if the appreciation causes firms to choose more
capital intensive technologies, and firms using more capital intensive technologies also use
more performance related pay, then the eﬀect of competition is mediated by the change
in technology and investment and is not really the direct result of competition per se. To
address the issue we checked whether firms in diﬀerent sectors were altering their behavior
in terms of investment, employment and asset accumulation in a diﬀerential way according
to their degree of openness. For this purpose we ran diﬀerence in diﬀerence regressions
of the variables of interest (investment, employment and assets) on the experiment. The
results were by and large insignificant. Although this is by no means an exhaustive test,
the fact that we found no significantly diﬀerent behavior in sectors with more exposure to
the appreciation relative to those with less exposure indicates that it is unlikely that this
sort of eﬀects is at work.13
In a related paper, Guadalupe (2004) uses the same experiment and shows that the
returns to skill widened with the increase in competition. This is an interesting result, as
the demand for higher skills or higher eﬀort can be seen as substitutes in a framework like
Vives (2004). However, changes in wage levels or returns to skill would not be captured
by our coeﬃcients of interest given the set of controls on wage levels. We also checked
for the presence of pre-existing diﬀerences or changes correlated with the experiment in
unionization levels and skill composition. The results show that unionization was more
intense in relatively open sectors, but there was no significant impact of the appreciation on
this diﬀerential. With respect to skill composition, there does not seem to be a pre-existing
diﬀerential across sectors and the appreciation reduced the presence of high skilled workers
in more open sectors.14 Given that performance-related-pay is more prevalent among high
skilled workers, this compositional change is likely to go against the results found in section
5. This reinforces the validity of our identification strategy.
We also run a number of robustness checks on the basic specification. These include
allowing for the slope of performance pay to vary with firm size and for its curvature to
13The results are available from the authors upon request.
14The data used for these tests are those in Guadalupe (2004), namely the New Earnings Survey and the
UK Labour Force Survey from 1993 to 1999. Pre-existing diﬀerences/correlations are evaluated in 1995.
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change after the experiment. Finally we allow for the possibility of relative performance
evaluation to be a part of compensation contracts, and to change with competition.
4 Data description
We use the FAME-BVD database, which contains balance sheets, profit and loss statements,
and complementary information of UK firms of all sizes. Firm size ranges from the largest
UK firms to firms of five employees only. Median assets are roughly 1.5 million pounds and
most firms are not quoted. The database, which covers the years 1992-2000, is an unbalanced
panel of 22,183 manufacturing firms. Information on average salaries is available for 83,530
firm-year observations, 82,779 observations have information on average directors’ wage and
24,982 observations on the highest director’s pay.
Three diﬀerent compensation measures are used as dependent variables. These are
derived from the annual company statements. The first one is total compensation of the
highest paid director, and contains all of the firm’s payments to the highest paid director in
a particular year, including both fixed and variable compensation elements, such as stock
options.15 Although occasionally it may be the chairman, in most cases the highest paid
director is the CEO.16 This is the only publicly available measure of top executive pay for
the UK, and the one used in virtually all related studies.17 In fact the amount of information
provided on each company varies, in particular many firms do not report pay to the highest
paid director explicitly.
Secondly, we use a measure of average executive pay, which contains the average remu-
neration received by the board members. Given that individual data is not available, this
measure is calculated as the ratio of total board compensation over the number of directors.
These include the top executives of the firm including the CEO, but also a proportion of
non-executive directors of the firm. Ideally one would like to separate these two diﬀerent
types of directors, as their roles are not exactly the same. However, this is not possible
in our sample. In any case, even though non-executive directors do not make direct man-
15Options in most company statements are valued at their exercise price. Ocasionally, for quoted firms
options are valued at their Black Scholes value when granted. In any case, given that less than 1% of the
firms in our sample are quoted, options are likely to have a smaller impact than in most of the existing
studies that concentrate on large quoted firms.
16 In fact in 27% of UK listed companies, both positions are held by the same individual. This number is
likely to be larger in small and medium sized firms (Conyon, 1997)
17With the notable exception of Conyon and Murphy (2000) who use direct information from the annual
reports of a cross section of firms in 1997.
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agement decisions, they do influence the strategic decisions of the firm, and can be seen
as agents of the shareholders, in a way similar to executive directors. Furthermore, the
presence of non executive directors in the UK is quite low when compared with the US.
Previous studies estimate that the proportion of non-executive directors on the board is
about 40-50% for large quoted firms. However among non quoted firms, the percentage of
firms with at least one non-executive director is between 33% and 47% for large firms, and
19% for small and medium sized firms (less than 50 employees). Given the predominance
of small and medium sized firms in our sample, it is likely that the proportion that do not
have any non-executive director represents more than three quarters of the total number
of firms.18 The pay measure is the average total remuneration of all board members, so
it includes the total remuneration that executive directors receive for their executive and
board activities, and the remuneration associated with being a member of the board for
non-executive directors.
Finally, we use average wage in the firm constructed as total wages paid over total
number of employees.19 The density of information on these three compensation variables
is not constant. For the variable covering the highest paid director there is an average of 2.1
observations per firm, while for the variables on average executive pay and average wages
there is a mean of 3.7 and 4.1 observations per firm respectively. We exclude from the sample
firms with less than 5 employees in which CEOs and directors are hardly comparable with
the rest of the sample. We also drop observations where the pay variable is zero because this
appears to come from mis-coding. Table 2 contains the summary statistics of the relevant
variables.
Most of the firms in the sample are not publicly traded. This has the advantage that
it is a very broad sample of firms, representative of the whole economy. It also implies
that one cannot use stock market based performance measures and therefore our measure
of performance is earnings before interests and taxes. Much existing literature focuses on
executive compensation of publicly traded companies and uses stock market returns as their
measure of performance. The fact that the vast majority of our firms are not listed on the
18See Conyon (1994) and Li and Wearing (2003) for the numbers on quoted firms and Berry and Perren
(2000) for the proportions of firms with at least one non-executive director. Using Berry and Perren´s
detailed stratification by firm size we can predict that 75.7% of the firms in our sample have a board that is
fully composed by executive directors. Non-executive directors are generally a small minority within their
boards among the remaining 24.3% of firms.
19The wage variable does not contain any stock option packages held by workers. Their imprortance is
likely to be small considering the size of the firms included.
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stock market implies that the only performance measure we can use is accounting based.
Existing research supports that accounting profits are a relevant measure of performance
when examining compensation packages (Bushman and Smith, 2001).
Incentive contracts often exhibit non-linearities, such as a minimum profit level needed
to qualify for a bonus, maximum wage caps or the non-linear nature of stock options. We
include a measure of profits squared in all the regressions to allow for the presence of any
non-linearities. Size is computed by the logarithm of total assets. Year dummies, firm
fixed eﬀects and a sector-specific time trend (at 3 digit SIC) are also included in all the
regressions.
The measures of openness are import penetration and export share of output measured
at a sector level defined by the SIC classification at three digits. These are measured as
import as a proportion of total output plus net imports and exports over total output
respectively. Since openness itself may be endogenous to changes in the exchange rate,
the measures of openness are defined at a sector level as the average openness in the years
before 1996 (1993 to 1995), which is kept constant for the whole sample.20 All the monetary
variables are in constant 1987 pounds.
Finally, the distribution of total pay is highly skewed to the left and contains several
extreme values. For this reason we eliminate as outliers observations whenever the pay
variable exceeds the value of the top 99% percentile of the sample.21
5 Results
Table 3 presents the results for highest director pay as dependent variable. The first column
estimates the raw sensitivity of CEO pay to firm profits, controlling for firm size, year
dummies, sector specific time trends and firm fixed eﬀects (these controls are present in
all the specifications). The estimated sensitivity is 0.10 pounds per thousand. This seems
a relatively small number, although it is comparable with the low sensitivities found in
other studies. However, given the size of the firms in our sample it is hard to find a
20These were obtained from the “Imports and exports data: MQ10 dataset”, elaborated by the Oﬃce
for National Statistics (ONS). The dataset provides seasonally adjusted imports and exports by three digit
SIC92 code at current prices (in million pounds), derived from the balance of payments. The data are
available yearly from 1990. To construct import penetration and export share, we use total production from
the UK census of manufactures ARD dataset. These data were provided by the ONS.
21The results including all observations are qualitatively the same but more unstable. The estimated
sensitivities are slightly higher and the R-squared is lower.
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truly comparable study with UK firms that could be used as a benchmark.22 Smaller
firms could have smaller pay-performance sensitivities because agency costs may be smaller
among them. At the same time there is abundant empirical evidence that identifies that
the proportion of profits devoted to performance-related-pay of executives is larger among
smaller firms.23
Column two includes the first competition variable, namely export share times a post
1997 dummy. The variable is introduced both in levels and interacted with profits. The coef-
ficient associated with the eﬀect of the increase in competition on the slope of performance-
related-pay (Export share∗Post 97∗Profit) has a clear positive sign and it is highly signi-
ficant; evaluated at the average export share it accounts for an increase in performance-
related-pay of 0.11 additional pounds per thousand.
Column three shows the diﬀerence in diﬀerences specification. To allow for a change
in the basic slope after 1997, we include the interaction between profit and the Post 1997
dummy (Profit∗Post 97), as well as a variable that interacts the export share index with
profits (Export share∗Profit). These two variables guarantee that the coeﬃcient of our
variable of interest (Export share∗Post 97∗Profit) truly captures the diﬀerential change in
slope by degree of openness. In the diﬀerence in diﬀerences specification, the test consists in
evaluating whether the coeﬃcient on the variable Export share∗Post 97∗Profit is statistically
diﬀerent from zero.
In economic terms, we test whether the performance-pay sensitivity of top director’s pay
increased more in sectors with a higher export share relative to sectors with low export share.
This means that we have to control for the average change in slope (Profit∗Post 97) and for
the cross sectional diﬀerences in slope prior to the experiment (Export share∗Profit). The
result shows a very significant eﬀect. The value of the relevant coeﬃcient is 1.09 pounds
per thousand. Evaluated at the average export share (0.30) it accounts for a change in
slope of 0.33 pounds per thousand, which is fairly large considering the average overall
pay-performance sensitivity. The diﬀerential eﬀect between a firm in the tenth percentile of
Export share with respect to a firm in the ninetieth percentile is 0.61 pounds per thousand
pounds. This indicates that after the appreciation, firms in sectors with more exposure to
exchange rate fluctuations reacted by increasing the sensitivity of performance-related-pay
oﬀered to their top executive relative to the firms that were less exposed to competition. In
22See Conyon, Gregg and Machin (1995) for a survey of similar results on UK firms.
23See for example Jensen and Murphy (1990). We did not find significant diﬀerences in the results when
using subsamples of firms of diﬀerent sizes.
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terms of competition, this indicates that an increase in product market competition makes
the implicit and explicit contracts that firms oﬀer to their employees more contingent on
the performance of the firm. This is the prediction in Raith (2003). In terms of Schmidt
(1997) and Vives (2004), it means that the eﬀect of increased elasticity of returns to eﬀort
(or to market stealing activities) dominates the reduction in size of the residual demand
and the disciplining eﬀect of the potential reduction in profits.
Columns four and five replicate the specifications in columns two and three, but as a
measure of exposure to the experiment they use the degree of import penetration. The
results are qualitatively identical to the previous ones. The coeﬃcients associated with the
experiment are slightly larger, but the average proportion of import penetration is 0.21.
In particular, the eﬀect of the diﬀerence in diﬀerences estimator evaluated at the average
level of import penetration is 0.37 pounds per thousand. It is interesting to point out that
the average sensitivity for all sectors also went up. Sensitivity went up by 0.17 pounds per
thousand when evaluated at the average export share and by 0.21 pounds per thousand when
evaluated at the average import penetration.24 The diﬀerence is statistically significant at
1%.
The change in the average sensitivity after 1996 is actually positive and statistically
significant in all the specifications, including some of the workers regressions, reported later
on, where the individual coeﬃcients are not statistically significant. This is important
because even though our identification strategy relies on the diﬀerential eﬀect of the ex-
periment across sectors, it is likely that competition went up as a whole in the economy
and the results show that the overall eﬀect goes in the same direction as the eﬀect of the
experiment.
Table 4 corresponds to the same specifications as in Table 3, but uses the average
director’s pay as a dependent variable. The sensitivity of pay to profits before conditioning
on any competition measure is now 0.02 pounds per thousand. This seems again a quite
small figure although it is consistent with the result on CEO pay, and it is statistically
significant. Columns two and three correspond again to the eﬀect of the experiment using
the share of exports as a proportion of total output as the treatment variable. Again,
the eﬀect is positive, statistically significant and economically sizeable. When evaluated
at the mean export share, the eﬀect is 0.027 pounds per thousand for the specification in
24The eﬀect can be calculated as the coeﬃcient on Profit*Post 1997 plus the coeﬃcient of the experiment
Open*Post 1997*Profit times the average openness measure.
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column two and 0.025 pounds per thousand for the specification in column three. The
equivalent results when using the import penetration share are shown in columns four and
five. Once again the coeﬃcients associated with the experiment are positive and statistically
significant. Their eﬀect at average exposure levels is 0.033 pounds per thousand and 0.027
pounds per thousand depending on the specification.
The coeﬃcient of the eﬀect of the experiment on the level of pay for directors and highest
paid directors (Export share∗Post 97 and Import penetration∗Post 97) is negative which
may suggest that firms substituted away from fixed to variable (performance-related) pay
and changed the whole structure of contracts. However, the coeﬃcient is not statistically
significant, so it cannot be interpreted as strong evidence in this direction.
Table 5 shows the results of the regressions using average wages of all workers as the
dependent variable. The estimated overall sensitivity is 0.0012 pounds per thousand, that
is, less than one pence per thousand pounds of profit. Evaluated at the average number of
employees per firm within our sample it amounts to 0.54 pounds per thousand profits paid
by firms as performance-related pay. In the other regressions relative to workers pay, this
sensitivity rises up to 1.73 pounds per thousand dollars of profits. This is a relatively small
number when compared with a similar figure of 41 dollars per thousand reported by Rayton
(2002) on a sample of US manufacturing firms. To our knowledge, there is no recent paper
that estimates the sensitivity of UK workers wages to contemporaneous firm profits on such
a comprehensive sample of firms.25
It is also documented that most workers do not get any performance-related
pay at all.26 Thus, the effect we estimate is the composition of many workers
with zero sensitivity, and some workers with sensitivities that are much lar-
ger at an individual level than the ones reported here. Unfortunately, given
the nature of our data we cannot disentangle between the two, and the es-
timated effect reflects the average estimated sensitivity of pay to performance.
Columns two and three (four and  five) show the effect of the increase in com-
petition using the export share (import penetration). The effect on the slope of
performance-related-pay is positive, and statistically significant for the differ-
25Hildreth and Oswald (1997) estimate the sensitivity of pay to a long series of profit lags of 329 companies
and 58 UK establishments finding small or insignificant results on contemporaneous profits.
26Burgess and Metcalfe (2000) report that, on average, only 18% of the UK workers in their sample
receive some kind of performance related pay. This number is 21% among managers. Blanchflower and
Oswald (1988) report that 25% of private sector workers of firms of more than 25 employees had some kind
of profit-sharing agreement. See also Rayton and Seaton (1999).
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ences specification using both openness measures. When evaluated at the av-
erage export share, it represents 0.0011 pounds per thousand for export share
and 0.0013 pounds per thousand for import penetration. However the dif-
ference in differences specification of column three and  five yield insignificant
treatment effects. This could be due to the fact that after 1997 all sectors in-
creased their slopes, (the coefficient on Profit*Post 97 is positive although not
statistically significant). Overall, the results in columns 3 to 5 show an increase
in performance-related pay after 1997, but the difference in difference results
for the slopes are not significant. The effect of competition on the  fixed com-
ponent of workers’ pay is positive but statistically not significant throughout
all the specifications.27
Tables 6 to 8 present a number robustness checks. The baseline specification for all
the regressions is the full diﬀerence in diﬀerences specification of columns three and five of
tables 3 to 5. In addition, we include additional control variables to assess the robustness
of the results. These additional controls may also help to elicit the channels through which
competition is acting.
The first two columns of each table include the measure of profit squared interacted with
the experiment; we introduce this variable because the results of the experiment may be
capturing changes in the convexity of performance-pay. The inclusion of this variable does
not alter the results of the regressions with respect to the variables of interest except in one
of the regressions relative to average workers pay where the experiment is now positive and
statistically significant. The coeﬃcient on profit squared was negative in all the diﬀerence
in diﬀerences specifications of Tables 3 to 5. The coeﬃcient on the profit squared variable
interacted with the experiment is negative in all the regressions of Tables 6 to 8, indicating
an increase in the concavity of the instruments used. However the coeﬃcient is statistically
significant in only two out of six regressions.
Columns three and four of each table introduce the interaction of firm size with profits
(this should capture the size eﬀect on slope) and the result on the eﬀect of the experiment
is not altered. The variable itself has a positive coeﬃcient that is highly significant in the
27As a robustness check of this  first set of results we also estimated the experiment year-
by-year in search of pre-existing trends prior to the experiment in the differential use of
performance-related-pay between relatively open or closed sectors  finding no significant pat-
terns prior to 1996 and a sudden increase in 1996 for both highest paid directors and average
directors pay. The results are available from the authors upon request.
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regressions on the average director’s pay, rounding significance in highest director pay, and
insignificant in the workers regression.28
Columns five and six include a measure of the average profitability of the sector to
which the firm belongs in order to assess the robustness of our result to the presence of
relative performance evaluation. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), Kedia (2003) and Joh
(1999) suggest that firms may commit to particular compensation structures depending
on the type and degree of competition. If firms design incentive pay on own and relative
performance, pay is set as y = a (own profit) +b(own profit − rival profit). We estimate
y = α (own profit) + β (rival profit) so that one can retrieve the parameters of interest
as a = α + β and b = −β. Therefore the coeﬃcient on rival profits should be interpreted
as the inverse of the weight given to relative performance, while the coeﬃcient on own
performance plus the coeﬃcient on rival profits should be interpreted as the weight given to
own performance.29 The variable (called RPE) is first generated by calculating the average
return on assets of the other firms that operate in the sector (at 3 digits SIC) where the firm
belongs. This average return on assets is multiplied by the assets of the firm. The variable
can be interpreted as the profit of a fictitious firm that had the average profitability of the
rival firms, but the same size as the relevant firm. Given that our performance measure is
in thousand pounds, this measure of the profitability of rival firms can be compared to own
performance.
The results on the eﬀect of competition on performance pay sensitivities are not aﬀected
by allowing for RPE and we still find that they increased significantly after the appreciation
for directors and highest paid director.
As far as the results on the RPE variables are concerned, they are statistically not signi-
ficant for workers and directors, which suggests the absence of relative performance evalu-
ation. On the other hand, the results for highest paid director are negative and statistically
significant. This indicates that firms may be using some degree of relative performance
28This contradicts some preexisiting results that show that smaller firms tend to have steeper incentive
contracts (see for example Baker and Hall 1998). Several factors may be driving this diﬀerence. First, we
use a sample of UK firms, while most of the existing work is performed on US firms. Second, the size of
the average firm in our sample is much smaller than the one of preexisting studies. Finally, the inclusion
of the profit squared variable (that presents a negative coeﬃcient throughout the paper) may be partially
capturing this negative size eﬀect.
29The variable is introduced in a diﬀerences specification. A specification as diﬀerence in diﬀerences had
similar results on the experiment, but presented some evidence of possible multicolinearity problems within
the RPE control variable
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evaluation. The size of the coeﬃcient is however one full order of magnitude smaller than
the sensitivity to own profits. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) find a positive coeﬃcient on
rivals’ performance and interpret it as evidence of strategic complementarities between firms
actions. The coeﬃcient on the experiment interacted with the RPE variable is positive and
significant at 10% only in one of the regressions.30
6 Conclusions
Changes in the competitive environment alter the distribution of profits that firms can
realize and at the same time create new implicit incentives for workers. These changes in
competition should therefore alter the design of compensation packages that firms oﬀer to
their employees.
We identify the eﬀects of changes in product market competition on the slope of performance-
related-pay of CEOs, directors and workers on a large sample of quoted and non-quoted
UK firms using a quasi-natural experiment as the source of increased competition. The
quasi-natural experiment used is the strong and unexpected appreciation of the pound in
1996 that aﬀected sectors in diﬀerent degrees depending on their exposure to trade. The
exogeneity of the experiment as a source of increased competition solves the possible endo-
geneity problems that arise when using more standard measures. Our results indicate that
sectors that were more exposed to foreign competition through the appreciation increased
the slope of their performance-related pay contracts post-appreciation substantially more
than sectors that were relatively shielded from it. This is true for highest paid directors and
average directors pay, regardless of specification. For workers, although we find significant
pay-performance baseline sensitivities, the eﬀect of competition is weaker and in particular
it becomes not significant in the full diﬀerence in diﬀerences specification. We also perform
a number of robustness checks including allowing for the possibility of relative performance
evaluation.
Overall, the results suggest a causal effect from increased product market
competition to increased sensitivity of pay to performance in contracts. How-
ever, given competition in product markets has increased for reasons other than
this particular appreciation, the actual effect of changing competition on com-
30This suggests that the experiment might have led the firms that were highly aﬀected by the appreciation
to use less standard relative performance evaluation on their highest paid director. However the validation
of this result would need a more detailed analysis that is beyond the scope of this article.
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pensation structures over the past thirty years may have been substantial. It
is left to future research to evaluate the extent of such changes.
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7 Figures and tables
Figure 1: Eﬀective Exchange Rate of the GBP Measured against a basket of all currencies,
weighted by their participation in UK imports and exports. Source: Bank of England
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Figure 2: Median profits of a balanced sample of firms. High (low) imports corresponds
with firms with import penetration above (below) the median
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Table 1: Goods Trade Balance All monetary variables in real terms (base 1987) Source
ONS
Exports Imports Balance
Periods
1992 107863 120913 -13050
1993 122229 135295 -13066
1994 135143 146269 -11126
1995 153577 165600 -12023
1996 167196 180918 -13722
1997 171923 184265 -12342
1998 164056 185869 -21813
1999 166166 195217 -29051
2000 187936 220912 -32976
Table 2: Summary Statistics. All monetary variables in real terms (base 1987). Pay
variables in pounds. Profit and assets in thousand pounds.
mean median standard dev. 10% 90%
Profit (thousand pounds sterling) 1328 29 28707 -250 10380
Highest paid director’s pay (Pound sterling) 88501 54319 165189 19335 170000
Directors pay (Pound sterling) 23444 14460 38628 3399 47856
Workers pay (Pound sterling) 12878 11271 20749 6745 20395
Log assets 7.3 7.2 1.9 4.9 20.3
Export share 0.30 0.25 0.26 0.03 0.59
Import penetration 0.21 0.21 0.14 0.02 0.39
RPE - Rival firms profit (rescaled by size) 147 22 55586 -51 485
Table 3: The eﬀect of the experiment on the total compensation of the highest paid
director.
Basic Export share Import Penetr.
1 2 3 4 5
Profit 0.1019 0.0645 0.2466 0.0770 0.2684
[3.57]*** [1.42] [2.32]** [1.64] [2.42]**
Export share* Post 97* Profit 0.3270 1.0907
[2.94]*** [3.53]***
Export share* Post 97 -4512 -5336
[0.88] [1.04]
Import penetr.* Post 97* Profit 0.4709 1.7731
[2.36]** [3.24]***
Import penetr.* Post 97 -14547 -15727
[1.58] [1.71]*
Profit* Post 97 -0.1520 -0.1542
[1.29] [1.24]
Import penetr.* Profit -1.4309
[2.90]***
Export share* Profit -0.8244
[2.89]***
Log assets 11127 11095 11040 11109 11035
[9.24]*** [9.21]*** [9.16]*** [9.22]*** [9.15]***
Profit squared -1.53E-07 -1.60E-07 -1.41E-07 -1.52E-07
[3.25]*** [3.26]*** [2.99]*** [3.04]***
Observations 23743 23743 23743 23743 23743
Number of firms 11653 11653 11653 11653 11653
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All regressions include firm fixed eﬀects and sector specific time trends. Profit: profit before
interest and taxes; Log assets is the natural log of total assets; Export share: share of
exports in the sector’s total inputs; Post 97 is a dummy variable that takes value zero in 1996
and before; Import penetration is the share of imports in sector total output.All monetary
variables in real terms (base 1987). Pay variables in pounds. Profit and assets in thousand
pounds.
Table 4: The eﬀect of the experiment on average directors pay
Basic Export share Import penetration
1 2 3 4 5
Profit 0.0223 0.0081 0.0400 0.0070 0.0300
[5.13]*** [1.68]* [3.58]*** [1.45] [2.58]***
Export share* Post 97* Profit 0.0914 0.0865
[6.66]*** [2.85]***
Export share* Post 97 -735 -753
[1.26] [1.29]
Import penetr.* Post 97* Profit 0.1657 0.1371
[7.08]*** [2.57]**
Import penetr.* Post 97 -1059 -1016
[1.03] [0.98]
Profit* Post 97 0.0199 0.0219
[1.70]* [1.83]*
Import penetr.*Profit -0.1474
[2.81]***
Export share* Profit -0.1132
[3.96]***
Log assets 5129 5115 5108 5111 5106
[36.32]*** [36.23]*** [36.20]*** [36.21]*** [36.18]***
Profit squared 2.09E-09 -2.03E-08 1.14E-09 -1.68E-08
[0.28] [2.33]** [0.15] [1.86]*
Observations 80620 80620 80620 80620 80620
Number of firms 22056 22056 22056 22056 22056
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All regressions include firm fixed eﬀects and sector specific time trends. Profit: profit before
interest and taxes; Log assets is the natural log of total assets; Export share: share of exports
in the sector’s total inputs; Post 97 is a dummy variable that takes value zero in 1996 and
before; Import penetration is the share of imports in sector total output. All monetary
variables in real terms (base 1987). Pay variables in pounds. Profit and assets in thousand
pounds.
Table 5: The eﬀect of the experiment on the structure of average workers pay.
Basic Export share Import penetration
1 2 3 4 5
Profit 0.0012 0.0025 0.0037 0.0024 0.0027
[2.57]** [3.52]*** [2.65]*** [3.46]*** [1.85]*
Export share* Post 97* Profit 0.0036 0.0041
[2.68]*** [1.46]
Export share* Post 97 103 102
[0.87] [0.86]
Import penetr.* Post 97* Profit 0.0065 0.0027
[2.43]** [0.53]
Import penetr.* Post 97 277 286
[1.32] [1.36]
Profit* Post 97 0.0004 0.0013
[0.32] [1.14]
Import penetr* Profit -0.0020
[0.35]
Export share* Profit -0.0039
[1.21]
Log assets 353 353 353 353 353
[13.06]*** [13.06]*** [13.05]*** [13.06]*** [13.06]***
Profit squared -1.63E-09 -1.83E-09 -1.53E-09 -1.81E-09
[4.48]*** [4.70]*** [4.32]*** [4.55]***
Observations 83375 83375 83375 83375 83375
Number of firms 19916 19916 19916 19916 19916
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All regressions include firm fixed eﬀects and sector specific time trends. Profit: profit before
interest and taxes; Log assets is the natural log of total assets; Export share: share of exports
in the sector’s total inputs; Post 97 is a dummy variable that takes value zero in 1996 and
before; Import penetration is the share of imports in sector total output. All monetary
variables in real terms (base 1987). Pay variables in pounds. Profit and assets in thousand
pounds.
Table 6: The eﬀect of the experiment on the total compensation of the highest paid
director. Robustness Checks
Profit squared interaction Size interaction Rival Profits
Openness measure: Export share Import penetr. Export share Import penetr. Export share Import penetr.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Profit 0.2576 0.2834 -0.4077 -0.3002 0.1963 0.2174
[2.41]** [2.55]** [1.08] [0.79] [1.82]* [1.94]*
Openness* Post 97* Profit 1.1955 2.0190 1.0644 1.7118 1.1578 1.8869
[3.74]*** [3.61]*** [3.44]*** [3.12]*** [3.71]*** [3.43]***
Openness* Post 97 -5544 -16081 -5200 -15408 -5756 -15891
[1.08] [1.75]* [1.01] [1.67]* [1.12] [1.73]*
Profit* Post 97 -0.1761 -0.1866 -0.1142 -0.1172 -0.1058 -0.1069
[1.48] [1.48] [0.96] [0.92] [0.89] [0.85]
Openness* Profit -0.8250 -1.4357 -0.7532 -1.3036 -0.7228 -1.2586
[2.90]*** [2.91]*** [2.62]*** [2.61]*** [2.48]** [2.51]**
Log assets 11032 11019 11111 11096 11005 11000
[9.15]*** [9.14]*** [9.21]*** [9.20]*** [9.13]*** [9.13]***
Profit squared. -9.31E-08 -7.02E-08 -2.29E-07 -2.10E-07 -4.04E-07 -3.96E-07
[1.30] [1.11] [3.68]*** [3.37]*** [5.28]*** [5.08]***
Openness* Post 97* profit sqd. -3.79E-07 -9.74E-07
[1.28] [2.13]**
Log assets* Profit 0.044 0.038
[1.81]* [1.56]
RPE -0.0716 -0.0678
[3.57]*** [3.91]***
Openness.* Post 97* RPE 0.0934 0.1380
[1.41] [1.67]*
Observations 23743 23743 23743 23743 23741 23741
Number of firm 11653 11653 11653 11653 11652 11652
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All regressions include firm fixed eﬀects and sector specific time trends. See tables 3 to 5 for the definition of the
variables. RPE corresponds to the profit of a firm of the same size with return of assets equal to the average return of
rival firms. All monetary variables in real terms (base 1987). Pay variables in pounds. Profit and assets in thousand
pounds.
Table 7: The eﬀect of the experiment on average director’s pay. Robustness Checks
Profit squared interaction Size interaction Rival Profits
Openness measure: Export share Import penetr Export share Import penetr Export share Import penetr
1 2 3 4 5 6
Profit 0.0402 0.0295 -0.0698 -0.0884 0.0410 0.0306
[3.60]*** [2.54]** [1.53] [1.87]* [3.62]*** [2.63]***
Openness* Post 97* Profit 0.1145 0.1601 0.0869 0.1363 0.0911 0.1423
[3.38]*** [2.86]*** [2.87]*** [2.55]** [2.89]*** [2.63]***
Profit* Post 97 -780 -1034 -752 -1000 -767 -1027
[1.34] [1.00] [1.29] [0.97] [1.32] [0.99]
Openness* Profit 0.0216 0.0245 0.0240 0.0262 0.0182 0.0204
[1.83]* [2.02]** [2.02]** [2.16]** [1.46] [1.65]*
Openness* Post 97 -0.1169 -0.1483 -0.1045 -0.1201 -0.1161 -0.1497
[4.08]*** [2.82]*** [3.63]*** [2.24]** [4.03]*** [2.85]***
Log assets 5102 5102 5114 5113 5109 5107
[36.14]*** [36.14]*** [36.24]*** [36.22]*** [36.20]*** [36.18]***
Profit squared. -1.83E-08 -1.52E-08 -2.35E-08 -1.90E-08 -2.06E-08 -1.68E-08
[2.09]** [1.66]* [2.67]*** [2.09]** [2.36]** [1.86]*
Openness* Post 97* profit sqd. -8.66E-08 -1.01E-07
[1.84]* [1.36]
Log assets* Profit 0.0070 0.0074
[2.49]** [2.58]***
RPE -0.0020 -0.0024
[0.46] [0.55]
Openness* Post97* RPE -0.0079 -0.0058
[0.62] [0.31]
Observations 80620 80620 80620 80620 80614 80614
Number of firm 22056 22056 22056 22056 22055 22055
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All regressions include firm fixed eﬀects and sector specific time trends. See tables 3 to 5 for the definition of the
variables. RPE corresponds to the profit of a firm of the same size with return of assets equal to the average return of
rival firms. All monetary variables in real terms (base 1987). Pay variables in pounds. Profit and assets in thousand
pounds.
Table 8: The eﬀect of the experiment on the structure of average workers pay. Robustness
Checks
Profit squared interaction Size interaction Rival Profits
Openness measure: Export share Import penetr Export share Import penetr Export share Import penetr
1 2 3 4 5 6
Profit 0.0030 0.0023 0.0042 0.0031 0.0037 0.0027
[2.08]** [1.51] [0.74] [0.54] [2.65]*** [1.86]*
Openness* Post 97* Profit 0.0071 0.0049 0.0040 0.0027 0.0042 0.0030
[2.06]** [0.84] [1.44] [0.51] [1.48] [0.57]
Openness* Profit 98 283 102 286 99 285
[0.82] [1.35] [0.86] [1.36] [0.84] [1.36]
Profit* Post 97 0.00001 0.0013 0.0004 0.0013 0.0003 0.0013
[0.01] [1.10] [0.33] [1.14] [0.29] [1.11]
Openness* Post 97 -0.0026 -0.0008 -0.0040 -0.0022 -0.0040 -0.0022
[0.79] [0.14] [1.20] [0.36] [1.23] [0.38]
Log assets 353 353 353 353 353 354
[13.03]*** [13.05]*** [13.04]*** [13.06]*** [13.06]*** [13.07]***
Profit squared. -9.50E-10 -1.32E-09 -1.82E-09 -1.80E-09 -1.84E-09 -1.82E-09
[1.36] [1.84]* [4.57]*** [4.50]*** [4.73]*** [4.58]***
Openness* Post 97* profit sqd. -2.95E-09 -3.15E-09
[1.50] [0.80]
Log assets* Profit -3.08E-05 -2.94E-05
[0.09] [0.08]
RPE -0.0001 -0.0001
[0.49] [0.40]
Openness.* Post 97* RPE -0.0002 -0.0001
[0.18] [0.12]
Observations 83375 83375 83375 83375 83366 83366
Number of firm 19916 19916 19916 19916 19915 19915
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All regressions include firm fixed eﬀects and sector specific time trends. See tables 3 to 5 for the definition of the
variables. RPE corresponds to the profit of a firm of the same size with return of assets equal to the average return of
rival firms. All monetary variables in real terms (base 1987). Pay variables in pounds. Profit and assets in thousand
pounds.
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